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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this study was to examine the influence of institutional ownership and 
leverage towards the aftermarket liquidity of 65 initial public offering (IPOs) that are 
listed on Bursa Malaysia, an emerging stock market in the South East Asia, from 
January 2011 to December 2015. This study begins from January 2011 to avoid the 
effects of the Global financial crisis in 2008. The data collected using the prospectus of 
the companies. The hypothesized effects are on liquidity based on the trading and signal 
and adverse selection theories. Trading and signal theory posits that institutional 
ownership contributes to higher level of aftermarket liquidity while adverse selection is 
vice versa. Trading volume is being used as a proxy of the liquidity of the stocks. Cross-
section regression method is conducted to investigate the effects of institutional 
ownership and leverage on the liquidity of newly listed shares. The result indicates 
relationship between private institutional ownership and the liquidity of IPOs is 
insignificant. However after interacts the institutional ownership and leverage using 
multiplication of the both independent variables using centering mean the result shows 
impact of institutional ownership on liquidity of IPOs is significantly negative. The 
negative relationship show trading based on private information will deteriorate 
information asymmetry, thus will increase the adverse selection costs and eventually 
will decrease stock market liquidity. For leverage the result is negatively significant 
associate with liquidity as firms with high leverage signaling negative for investors since 
if firms need to finance a new project then new external financing will be needed 
accordingly the agency cost also increase. The significance of the study is to help the 
firm and investors to strategize their investment strategy as liquidity is important aspects 
in investment. 
 
Keywords: Initial Public Offerings, Institutional ownership, Leverage, Adverse selection 
theory, Trading and signal theory 
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ABSTRAK 
 
 Tujuan kajian ini adalah untuk mengkaji pengaruh pemilikan institusi dan 
leverage terhadap kecairan selepas pasaran 65 tawaran awam permulaan (IPO) yang 
disenaraikan di Bursa Malaysia, pasaran saham baru muncul di Asia Tenggara, dari 
Januari 2011 hingga Disember 2015. Kajian ini bermula dari Januari 2011 untuk 
mengelakkan kesan krisis kewangan global pada tahun 2008. Data yang dikumpul 
menggunakan prospektus syarikat-syarikat. Kajian ini menggunakan hipotesis 
berdasarkan kepada perdagangan dan isyarat dan teori pemilihan yang buruk. 
Perdagangan dan teori isyarat menegaskan bahawa pemilikan institusi menyumbang 
kepada tahap yang lebih tinggi kecairan selepas pasaran manakala pemilihan yang buruk 
adalah sebaliknya. Jumlah dagangan digunakan sebagai proksi kepada kecairan saham. 
Kaedah regresi keratan rentas dijalankan untuk menyiasat kesan pemilikan institusi dan 
memanfaatkan kecairan saham yang disenaraikan. Hasil kajian telah menunjukkan 
hubungan antara pemilikan institusi swasta dan kecairan IPO adalah tidak penting. 
Namun selepas berinteraksi institusi pemilikan dan leverage menggunakan pendaraban 
daripada kedua-dua pemboleh ubah bebas yang berpusat bermakna hasilnya 
menunjukkan kesan pemilikan institusi mengenai kecairan IPO adalah negatif yang 
ketara. Hubungan negatif menunjukkan hubungan berdasarkan maklumat peribadi akan 
merosot maklumat asimetri, dengan itu akan meningkatkan kos pemilihan yang buruk 
dan akhirnya akan mengurangkan kecairan pasaran saham. Untuk leverage hasilnya 
adalah negatif hububg kait signifikan dengan kecairan syarikat dengan leverage yang 
tinggi isyarat negatif kepada pelabur kerana jika firma perlu membiayai projek baru 
kemudian pembiayaan luar yang baru akan diperlukan sewajarnya kos agensi itu juga 
meningkat. Kepentingan kajian ini adalah untuk membantu firma dan pelabur untuk 
menyusun strategi strategi pelaburan mereka kecairan adalah aspek penting dalam 
pelaburan. 
 
Kata kunci: Tawaran Awam Permulaan, pemilikan Institusi, Leverage, teori pilihan 
buruk, Perdagangan dan isyarat teori 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of Study 
According to Jung et al. (1996) and Brealey et al. (2008) sale of company securities 
to the public for the first time via primary market can be called as an initial public 
offering (IPO). An IPO normally being executed during the phase when company‟s 
equity demands cannot be fulfilled by a single investor or a group of propriety 
investors and the result is it eventually will change the ownership structure from 
concentrated in few investor's hands into bigger numbers of investors argue by 
Miloud (2014). As a result, the trading activity of that particular company shares 
become more liquid. Besides liquidity purposes for going IPO, another reason is to 
improve the ability of the original owners to raise a larger pool amount of funds for 
investment, repaying debt and growth (Mikkelson, Partch and Shah 1997). IPOs also 
gives opportunities for investors to obtain more profit when the shares are issued and 
traded publicly, in which able to enhance liquidity in order to allow firm for raising 
capital on the favorable term (Ritter, 1998). However not necessarily when one going 
for IPO it always profitable and outperform the market performances especially for 
investors. Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) make a study by comparing performances of 
IPOs and market using return of aftermarket on IPOs and returns on market the result 
is market performance better than IPO in the long-run. In addition researched made 
by Ritter (1991) find average three-year performance of IPOs is bad than market 
performance and that of the matching firms. Ritter said that negative long-run 
performance of IPOs is due to the fads in IPO market. This shows going for IPO has 
its own advantages and loopholes. 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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APPENDIX A 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS INDICATORS FOR THE VARIABLES OF THE RESEARCH 
 
  Volume 
Shareholder 
retention 
Risk Priv 
Offer 
price 
Offer 
size 
Leverage Board 
 Mean  5633.647  69.77287  0.051210  54.22912  1.029231  7.929874  0.468308  0.753846 
 Median  2817.847  70.86774  0.038495  68.09211  0.750000  7.695830  0.470000  1.000000 
 Maximum  36256.21  94.78369  0.159891  93.33000  3.380000  9.804055  1.240000  1.000000 
 Minimum  26.88000  8.937290  0.002991  0.000000  0.120000  6.864587  0.020000  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  7391.115  11.76471  0.037973  31.36148  0.803886  0.767930  0.263756  0.434122 
 Skewness  2.330762 -2.135072  0.998134 -0.70819  1.313927  0.884025  0.676216 -1.17857 
 Kurtosis  8.551984  12.48144  3.274395  2.016568  3.997739  2.684280  3.697567  2.389031 
 Jarque-Bera  142.3346  292.8570  10.99686  8.052552  21.39882  8.736221  6.271606  16.05881 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.004093  0.017841  0.000023  0.012675  0.043465  0.000326 
 Sum  366187.1  4535.237  3.328669  3524.893  66.90000  515.4418  30.44000  49.00000 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
 3.50E+09  8858.144  0.092287  62946.71  41.35886  37.74188  4.452314  12.06154 
         
 Observations  65  65  65  65  65  65  65  65 
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APPENDIX B 
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, LEVERAGE 
AND INTERACTION  OF INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND LEVERAGE 
WITH LIQUIDITY OF IPOs. 
 
Dependent Variable: VOLUME_30_DAYS  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/20/16   Time: 15:16   
Sample: 1 65    
Included observations: 65   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PRIV 30.59699 22.06148 1.386897 0.1710 
LEV -5920.550 3493.650 -1.694660 0.0957 
LOG_OFFER_SIZE 8791.917 2407.642 3.651670 0.0006 
OFFERPRICE_RM_ -5687.545 1848.502 -3.076839 0.0032 
RISK_30 36025.58 18418.82 1.955912 0.0555 
SHARE_RETENTION 148.2939 97.36919 1.523006 0.1334 
BOARD -4711.669 2700.942 -1.744454 0.0866 
CENTLEV*CENTPRIV -171.4925 75.33176 -2.276496 0.0267 
C -65887.57 21235.28 -3.102741 0.0030 
     
     R-squared 0.320374    Mean dependent var 5633.647 
Adjusted R-squared 0.223284    S.D. dependent var 7391.115 
S.E. of regression 6513.899    Akaike info criterion 20.52915 
Sum squared resid 2.38E+09    Schwarz criterion 20.83022 
Log likelihood -658.1974    Hannan-Quinn criter. 20.64794 
F-statistic 3.299777    Durbin-Watson stat 1.911062 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.003725    Wald F-statistic 3.477849 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.002533    
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APPENDIX C 
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND LEVERAGE 
WITH LIQUIDITY OF IPOs 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: VOLUME_30_DAYS  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/15/16   Time: 21:53   
Sample: 1 65    
Included observations: 65   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PRIV 24.42355 29.24711 0.835076 0.4072 
LEV -6022.237 3364.538 -1.789915 0.0788 
LOG_OFFER_SIZE 9051.941 2409.023 3.757516 0.0004 
OFFERPRICE_RM_ -5443.342 2245.645 -2.423954 0.0185 
RISK_30 30501.25 24534.12 1.243218 0.2189 
BOARD -5816.486 2274.392 -2.557380 0.0132 
SHARE_RETENTION 149.5291 80.81285 1.850314 0.0695 
C -66659.18 19488.29 -3.420473 0.0012 
     
     R-squared 0.278440    Mean dependent var 5633.647 
Adjusted R-squared 0.189828    S.D. dependent var 7391.115 
S.E. of regression 6652.710    Akaike info criterion 20.55825 
Sum squared resid 2.52E+09    Schwarz criterion 20.82587 
Log likelihood -660.1433    Hannan-Quinn criter. 20.66385 
F-statistic 3.142223    Durbin-Watson stat 1.822745 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.007064    
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APPENDIX D 
 
MULTICOLLINEARITY TEST 
 
 
 
Variance Inflation Factors  
Date: 10/05/16   Time: 15:50  
Sample: 1 65   
Included observations: 65  
    
     Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
    
    SHARE_RETENTION  6530.717  47.99993  1.307093 
RISK_30  6.02E+08  3.573428  1.255118 
PRIV  855.3936  4.911012  1.216583 
OFFERPRICE_RM_  5042923.  12.55809  4.712526 
LOG_OFFER_SIZE  5803390.  540.9066  4.948893 
LEV  11320117  4.784888  1.138779 
BOARD  5172859.  5.727032  1.409731 
C  3.80E+08  557.7809  NA 
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APPENDIX E 
 
HETEROSKEDASTICITY TEST 
 
 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 2.281819    Prob. F(41,23) 0.0188 
Obs*R-squared 52.17339    Prob. Chi-Square(41) 0.1133 
Scaled explained SS 100.4760    Prob. Chi-Square(41) 0.0000 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/24/16   Time: 03:35   
Sample: 1 65    
Included observations: 65   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.24E+10 9.31E+09 1.326110 0.1978 
PRIV^2 45714.96 22837.79 2.001724 0.0572 
PRIV*LEV 29752133 51463111 0.578125 0.5688 
PRIV*LOG_OFFER_SIZE 1728023. 1287425. 1.342232 0.1926 
PRIV*OFFERPRICE_RM_ -3738248. 2079974. -1.797257 0.0854 
PRIV*RISK_30 11642275 16511861 0.705086 0.4878 
PRIV*SHARE_RETENTION 64295.62 58433.27 1.100326 0.2826 
PRIV*BOARD 1227063. 1380365. 0.888941 0.3832 
PRIV*CENTLEV*CENTPRIV -121564.9 101512.3 -1.197539 0.2433 
PRIV -32932156 31877244 -1.033093 0.3123 
LEV^2 2.44E+08 1.75E+08 1.396998 0.1757 
LEV*LOG_OFFER_SIZE -4.12E+08 3.06E+08 -1.346823 0.1912 
LEV*OFFERPRICE_RM_ 3.86E+08 3.53E+08 1.093711 0.2854 
LEV*RISK_30 8.92E+09 4.93E+09 1.810007 0.0834 
LEV*SHARE_RETENTION -6657008. 5983529. -1.112555 0.2774 
LEV*BOARD -1.88E+08 2.36E+08 -0.796072 0.4341 
LEV*CENTLEV*CENTPRIV -14370606 9951877. -1.444010 0.1622 
LEV 1.35E+09 2.24E+09 0.603419 0.5521 
LOG_OFFER_SIZE^2 2.54E+08 1.51E+08 1.677207 0.1070 
LOG_OFFER_SIZE*OFFERPRICE_RM_ -4.16E+08 2.65E+08 -1.567413 0.1307 
LOG_OFFER_SIZE*RISK_30 -3.19E+09 1.54E+09 -2.074586 0.0494 
LOG_OFFER_SIZE*SHARE_RETENTION 7495098. 4784800. 1.566439 0.1309 
LOG_OFFER_SIZE*BOARD -4.31E+08 2.31E+08 -1.868042 0.0745 
LOG_OFFER_SIZE*CENTLEV*CENTPRIV -2659748. 5564086. -0.478021 0.6371 
LOG_OFFER_SIZE -3.51E+09 2.26E+09 -1.551758 0.1344 
OFFERPRICE_RM_^2 1.36E+08 1.09E+08 1.244200 0.2260 
OFFERPRICE_RM_*RISK_30 1.33E+09 7.50E+08 1.770615 0.0899 
OFFERPRICE_RM_*SHARE_RETENTION -11391685 6210398. -1.834292 0.0796 
OFFERPRICE_RM_*BOARD 7.88E+08 2.22E+08 3.549159 0.0017 
OFFERPRICE_RM_*CENTLEV*CENTPRIV 8582856. 6737942. 1.273810 0.2155 
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OFFERPRICE_RM_ 3.01E+09 2.15E+09 1.399582 0.1750 
RISK_30^2 -1.68E+10 1.15E+10 -1.457534 0.1585 
RISK_30*SHARE_RETENTION -51849881 62810214 -0.825501 0.4176 
RISK_30*BOARD 9.52E+08 2.05E+09 0.465441 0.6460 
RISK_30*CENTLEV*CENTPRIV 52518934 80078153 0.655846 0.5184 
RISK_30 2.34E+10 1.29E+10 1.817129 0.0823 
SHARE_RETENTION^2 -25789.75 71593.63 -0.360224 0.7220 
SHARE_RETENTION*BOARD -2276469. 5260183. -0.432774 0.6692 
SHARE_RETENTION*CENTLEV*CENTPRIV -17946.50 230502.9 -0.077858 0.9386 
SHARE_RETENTION -40062598 38161207 -1.049825 0.3047 
BOARD^2 3.03E+09 1.78E+09 1.708616 0.1010 
BOARD*CENTLEV*CENTPRIV -7492290. 7898689. -0.948549 0.3527 
     
     R-squared 0.802668    Mean dependent var 36555836 
Adjusted R-squared 0.450901    S.D. dependent var 83920959 
S.E. of regression 62186454    Akaike info criterion 38.98259 
Sum squared resid 8.89E+16    Schwarz criterion 40.38758 
Log likelihood -1224.934    Hannan-Quinn criter. 39.53695 
F-statistic 2.281819    Durbin-Watson stat 2.421447 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.018766    
     
     
 
 
 
 
